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Abstract—This paper proposes a method to completely hide
the functionality of a digital standard cell. This is accomplished
by a differential threshold logic gate (TLG). A TLG with n inputs
implements a subset of Boolean functions of n variables that are
linear threshold functions. The output of such a gate is one if
and only if an integer weighted linear arithmetic sum of the
inputs equals or exceeds a given integer threshold. We present a
novel architecture of a TLG that not only allows a single TLG
to implement a large number of complex logic functions, which
would require multiple levels of logic when implemented using
conventional logic primitives, but also allows the selection of that
subset of functions by assignment of the transistor threshold
voltages to the input transistors. To obfuscate the functionality
of the TLG, weights of some inputs are set to zero by setting
their device threshold to be a high Vt. The threshold voltage
of the remaining transistors is set to low Vt to increase their
transconductance. The number of low Vt transistors whose gates
are driven by a given input xi determines the weight of that
input. The function of a TLG is not determined by the cell itself
but rather the signals that are connected to its inputs. This makes
it possible to hide the support set of the function by essentially
removing some variable from the support set of the function.
This is done by selective assignment of high and low Vt to the
input transistors. We describe how a standard cell library of
TLGs can be mixed with conventional standard cells to realize
complex logic circuits, whose function can never be discovered
by reverse engineering. A 32-bit Wallace tree multiplier and
a 28-bit 4-tap filter were synthesized on an ST 65nm process,
placed and routed, then simulated including extracted parastics
with and without obfuscation. By obfuscating the cells the delay
was shown to increase by approximately 5% at the cell level.
Both obfuscated designs had much lower area (25%) lower area
and much lower dynamic power (30%) than their nonobfuscated
CMOS counterparts, operating at the same frequency.
I. INTRODUCTION
With growing competition in the silicon industry, there is
an increasing need to conceal the functionality of a circuit
design. This is due to the increasing use of reverse engineering
by competitors, both foreign and domestic, aimed at stealing
hardware intellectual property (IP). Reverse engineering of a
product can lead to companies loosing competitive advantages
and losing market share to counterfeit products. It has been
estimated that counterfeit products cost the semiconductor
industry $4 billion a year [1]. Examples of counterfeit products
in such systems include airplane landing lights, radiation de-
tectors, automotive breaking systems and defibrillators [2]. The
consequences of using counterfeit chips include the premature
failure of critical systems. This is due to counterfeit chips
that are manufactured cheaper and at a lower quality than
the original. Because of this, there is a need for innovative
solutions to protect hardware IP from reverse engineering. To
combat these counterfeit parts many industries have adopted
standards of manufacturing to minimize counterfeiting [3].
A. Reverse Engineering
By reverse engineering an integrated circuit (IC) coun-
terfeiters can gain insight into the design of the circuit.
Reverse engineering itself has become a major challenge for
counterfeiters due to the high cost and time required to reverse
engineer sub-micron circuits. One can reverse engineer an IC
by learning the circuitry of the chip through optical imaging or
the use of a scanning electron microscope (SEM) [4]. In this
process of each layer of the chip is removed one at a time and
a picture is taken of that layer. Due to the variety of different
feature sizes in modern ICs, many different techniques are
used today to remove each layer. These techniques include dry
etching, wet etching and polishing of the chip. Each image will
show the electrical connections in that layer. By assembling
the images, it is possible to reveal all electrical connections
that constitute the chip. There is commercial software available
that can aid in the reconstruction of the electrical connections
from SEM images. This software can export spice level netlists
for simulation of the IC [4].
To combat reverse engineering, researchers have come up
with many different circuit level defenses. These defenses
can be separated into two different types: non-obfuscated and
obfuscated defenses. A non-obfuscated defense is an approach
where an attacker can still see the functionality of the chip.
However, if they did reproduce the chip it could be detected
as a counterfeit. An obfuscated defense is where an attacker
cannot learn the functionality of the chip. The approach
presented in this paper is an obfuscated defense.
B. Non-Obfuscated Defenses
A non-obfuscated defense can be viewed as a watermark or
fingerprint, where a unique structure is added to the hardware
to prove the identity of the intellectual property (IP) [5]. The
difference between the two is a watermark is added to identify
the designer and a fingerprint is added to identify the buyer
[6]. Using this approach an attacker may be able to see the
functionality of the chip, but may not be able to duplicate it.
This watermark or fingerprint can include a hidden feature in
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the datapath, control path, or a hidden layout feature that is
hard to duplicate. One solution is to add sheets of M1 to the
filler cells. By doing so, the cells become highly reflective
when the chip is illuminated [5]. As this may be a detail
that counterfeiters overlook, the reflectivity of the chip can
be used to determine counterfeiting and detection of trojans.
Any extra hardware added by the fab will cause the surface to
be less reflective, as there will be fewer filler cells. Another
watermarking approach is to include a unique number of clock
buffers in the synthesis of the chip [7]. In doing so, if someone
reverse engineers the chip and attempts to make a counterfeit,
the number of buffers could be different. This is because
clock buffers are automatically added by the synthesis tool.
Therefore, the number of clock buffers can be used to identify
a counterfeit chip. As both of these methods are passive,
there is no additional area or power cost for watermarking
or fingerprinting.
A more advanced watermarking, or fingerprinting strategy is
to add some functionality that is physically uncloneable. These
circuits are called physically uncloneable functions (PUF).
They work by creating a circuit where the functionality is
highly dependent upon process variations and is therefore very
hard to reproduce. If the circuit is reverse engineered and
cloned, it will not work due to differences in the process
variations. An obvious candidate for a PUF is a ring of an
even number of inverters, as it will settle at a 1 or a 0
depending upon process variations, if it is not programmed [8].
The output is measured, the circuit is reset and the output
is measured again. A golden distribution of outputs will
be generated. When, an unverified chip is measured, the
distribution of outputs should be similar. If it is not, than
the circuit is a counterfeit. This is because the output of an
uninitialized memory element is a function of the parasitics. So
as long as the parasitics are the same from device to device, the
distribution of outputs for the uninitialized memory element
should be the same. Therefore, an attacker may be able to
counterfeit the chip, but the PUF will act as a watermark.
C. Obfuscated Defenses
The other class of circuit level defenses is obfuscated
defenses, in which an attacker may not be able to reverse
engineer the functionality of the chip. One approach of this
type is to make the layouts of all of the standard cells the same,
so that a NOR gate looks identical to a NAND gate. This is
done through hiding the connections in between transistors.
This can be done by using false vias between layers [9] to
hide connections. The disadvantage of this approach is that
it requires a special manufacturing process for the false vias
and increases the capacitance among wires. This approach
substantially increases the power, delay and area of the cell
library by approximately 500%, 150% and 400% respectively.
Because of this, the authors propose only obfuscating 5% of
the total gates in a large design. The total circuit overhead was
approximately 80% increase in power, 70% increase in area
and 50% increase in delay for the ISCAS test circuits.
Another method to conceal connections is through adding
connections through diffusion [10]. By doing so, one can
create inverters that are stuck at a logic one, or a logic zero.
Using these obfuscated inverters, one can hide the true number
of inputs into a function. The disadvantage of this approach
is a large increase in area and delay. One paper reported that
this approach increased the area by 587% and the delay by
250% [10].
Other non-hardware defenses include the use of software
keys to define the datapath flow [11]. A software key is a
control signal that changes the control flow of a datapath. The
software key can be a selector bit for a Mux [11], or a lookup
table [12], or an XOR gate [13]. This approach increases the
area by an average of 0.63% and the power by 2.6% [11]. The
overhead was so low because the authors only obfuscated 5%
of the total number of cells in the design.
One of the most secure ways to obfuscate a function
is by selectively changing the threshold voltage of certain
transistors. Since the threshold voltage depends upon the
gate oxide thickness, it is very difficult to detect changes
in Vt through SEM images. This approach has been used
previously to obfuscate standard cells at the expense of static
DC current [14]. In [14], the logical inputs are made to a
pMOS pull up network. The threshold voltage of the nMOS
pull down network is varied to create either a NAND, or a
NOR gate. In this paper we expand on this idea to obfuscate
larger logical functions, by varying Vt and without creating
DC currents or degrading performance or area or power.
The remainder of this paper is divided up into the following
sections. Section II gives a brief introduction to threshold logic
and the circuit level implementation of a threshold logic gate
(TLG). Section III shows cell level obfuscation and compares
obfuscated and nonobfuscated threshold gates to their CMOS
counterparts. The functions used for comparison are a 3-input
AND function and a 3-input XOR function. Section IV uses
the obfuscated cell library proposed in Section III to build
larger circuits. An obfuscated Wallace Tree Multiplier and an
obfuscated FIR Filter are synthesized and placed and routed.
The circuits are compared to their nonobfuscated CMOS
counterparts for comparison of area and power. Section V
draws conclusions on the obfuscated cells and wraps up the
paper.
II. THRESHOLD LOGIC
Threshold logic is a subset of Boolean logic. A Boolean
logic function is defined as a threshold logic function if the
function f(x1, x2, ..., xn) along with its associated weights
(w1, w2, ...) and threshold T satisfy
f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) =
{
1 if
∑n
i=i wixi ≥ T
0 otherwise. (1)
Where the weights wn, the threshold T are integers and the
inputs xn are Boolean variables. A threshold function will be
represented as [w1, w2, ...wn;T ]. Boolean threshold functions
can be determined through Binary Decision Diagrams [15].
Circuit implementation of threshold logic has been the focus
of much research [16]. It has been previously shown that by
implementing logic with threshold cells, one can save area and
power, compared to their CMOS counterpart.
A. Circuit Implementation of Threshold Logic
A circuit that evaluates Equation 1 this paper will refer to as
a threshold logic gate (TLG). A TLG will make a comparison
between n number of inputs and their associated weights w
and a threshold T . To identify different threshold cells, TLGs
will follow the naming scheme TLG-n, where n is the number
of inputs. In the proposed TLG, shown in Figure 1, two input
networks act as the logical inputs and a threshold value T .
Assignment of signals to the input network determine the
functionality of the cell. For example, the equation f = a∨ bc
is represented as f = [2, 1, 1; 2]. To avoid any case where
the input side is equal to the threshold side we double the
input variables and increase the threshold by 50%. Therefore,
the equation becomes f = [4, 2, 2; 3]. This produces a signal
assignment of left input network = a¯, a¯, a¯, a¯, b¯, b¯, c¯, c¯ and right
input network = 0, 0, 0. Note that the signals are inverted due
to the inputs being pMOS in Figure 1. This signal assignment
is unoptimized as it requires 8 transistors on one side and 3
transistors on the other side. Some of the signals are moved
from one side to the other for an optimal signal assignment
of f = a ∨ bc to be left input network= a¯, a¯, b¯, c¯, c¯ right
input network = a, a, b, 1, 1. Note that all of these inputs will
be connected to low Vt transistors, as they are unobfuscated
inputs. Random signals will be connected to high Vt inputs
to hide the functionality of the cell. In the above example a
TLG-5 with 1 or 2 extra obfuscated inputs can be used.
The TLG shown in Figure 1 consists of three parts: an input
network, a sense amplifier and a latch. The circuit works in
the following manor:
1) The logical inputs and the threshold are applied to the
left and right input networks.
2) The clock rises from a 0 to a 1, causing nodes N5 and
N6 to rise from a 0 to a 1. The rate at which they rise
is dependent upon the number of transistors on and the
associated transconductance (gm) of each transistor.
3) The race condition between N5 and N6 will set the sense
amplifier to either a 1 or 0.
4) The sense amplifier will set the latch and the latched
value will appear as output Q.
5) The clock will fall from 1 to 0 causing N5 and N6 to be
reset to 0, while maintaining the output Q in the latch.
Therefore, the circuit acts as an edge triggered flip flop.
Large Boolean functions can be absorbed by the cell, as the
functionality of the cell is determined by the input signal
assignment. Provided that the absorbed logic has a delay of one
clock cycle. Therefore, it requires lower energy, area and delay
compared to a CMOS implementation of the same Boolean
function [16].
B. Obfuscation of TLG Circuit
The TLG topology shown in Figure 1 can be easily obfus-
cated. As the functionality of the TLG is determined by the
Fig. 1. TLG With Obfuscated Inputs
input selection, it is a natural candidate for an obfuscated cell
library. To obfuscate the functionality of the TLG gate this
paper recommends increasing the Vt on some input transistors
and lowering the Vt on other input transistors. By doing so,
the low Vt transistors will have a large transconductance,
therefore, a large weight in Equation 1; high Vt transistors
will have a low transconductance, therefore a small weight
in Equation 1. If the difference in Vt is large enough, than
the difference in weights will be large enough to effectively
remove the small weights for high Vt transistors. So by setting
two of the inputs on each side to high Vt and setting the rest
of the inputs to low Vt, the high Vt inputs will be logically
removed from the calculation of Equation 1. Also, the weight
on the other inputs will only be determined by the number of
transistors that are connected to the input signal. Therefore, if
someone were to reverse engineer the circuit they would not
observe that some of the inputs are logically separated from the
calculation of the function without measuring the Vt of every
input transistor. Since it is very difficult to observe Vt in a
large layout, this approach is difficult to defeat. The novelty
of this approach is that it means an attacker would not even
know that the circuit was obfuscated. This defense can also
hide the functionality of the circuit from the foundry. As the
Vt mask is used to determine obfuscated and nonobfuscated
inputs. Without it, it is impossible to know the operation of
the circuit. Because of this, one could split the fabrication up
into two different foundries. One foundry would only apply
the Vt mask and the other foundry would fabricate the rest of
the chip. Another advantage of the TLG architecture is since it
is comparator based, the dynamic power consumed each clock
cycle is approximately the same regardless of what function
is being calculated. Therefore, the circuit would be immune
to power attacks.
Using this technique a cell library of 7 cells was designed
and laid out in 65nm technology. The cells were a TLG-3,
TLG-5, TLG-7 with 1 and 2 extra obfuscated inputs and a
TLG-9 with one extra obfuscated input. A summary of how
many obfuscated functions each cell can produce is shown in
Table I. This number is calculated by
Y =
(
(n + k)
k
)2
. (2)
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OBFUSCATED CELL LIBRARY
Name
# of Obfuscated Devices on
One Side
TLG-3
1
TLG-3
2
TLG-5
1
TLG-5
2
Combinations of
Obfuscated Functions 9 9 25 100
Name
# of Obfuscated Devices on
One Side
TLG-7
1
TLG-7
2
TLG-9
1
Combinations of
Obfuscated Functions 49 441 81
TABLE II
Vt DISTRIBUTION OF PMOS FOR 10000 SAMPLES AT 1.1V 25C
Mean Standard Deviation
LVT -280mV 19.5mV
SVT -433mV 22.8mV
HVT -604mV 21.7mV
Where Y is the number of different ways the gate can
be obfuscated, n in the number of valid inputs, and k is
the number of obfuscated inputs. Since threshold gates are
high fan-in gates, more than one input may be obfuscated.
This means a single obfuscated threshold gate can represent
more functions than a single obfuscated CMOS gate. For
example, an obfuscated CMOS cell in [9] can represent one
of three separate functions, while a TLG-7 with 2 extra
obfuscated inputs can be obfuscated in 1296 different ways.
These cells were characterized and used in high level synthesis
to obfuscate larger circuits. To maximize the yield of an
obfuscated TLG, the supply voltage was lowered to 1.1V. In
doing so, the Vgs of the input transistors are lowered, allowing
the transistors to be more sensitive to Vt variations. Lowering
the supply voltage lower than 1.1V causes the circuit to fail
more often because of errors in the sense amplifier. The yield
of the circuit will be affected by power supply noise, as will
every comparator based circuit.
A distribution of the Vt for pMOS transistors in 65nm
technology is shown in Table II. In the TLG-9 circuit in Figure
1, these different Vt correspond to peak drain currents on the
input transistors of 15.3uA for the low Vt and 4.54uA for the
high Vt. So the drain current of the low Vt transistor is 3.37
times larger than the drain current for the high Vt transistor.
In Figure 1 since two inputs are obfuscated away, the circuit
would be referred to as a TLG-7 with two obfuscated inputs.
Since this circuit works by comparing two rising voltages
on nodes N5 and N6, the difference between the two nodes
determines the robustness of the cell. Therefore, a process with
a large difference in Vts is required for this technique to work.
If the difference in Vts is too small then the logically removed
inputs will begin to have an effect on the circuit and the circuit
will not be obfuscated.
III. CELL LEVEL OBFUSCATION
To prove the cell level operation of the obfuscated TLG
two different functions were tested with an obfuscated TLG
cell. The two cell level designs demonstrated in this paper
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF CMOS, HYBRID OBFUSCATED AND HYBRID
NONOBFUSCATED 3-INPUT AND GATE, 1.1V 105C SS WITH 20FF LOAD
CMOS Hybrid NonObfuscated Hybrid Obfuscated
Setup Time 186ps -58ps 8ps
Clock to Q 258ps 353ps 441ps
Total Delay 444ps 295ps 449ps
are an obfuscated 3-input AND cell and an obfuscated 3-
input XOR cell. For each circuit we compare the functionally
sequential equivalent CMOS version to our TLG version, both
nonobfuscated and obfuscated. The TLG version is termed
Hybrid to differentiate it from CMOS. Experiments were
performed on extracted layout netlists using HSpice. The setup
time, nominal clock to Q, and total delay for the obfuscated
and non-obfuscated versions of each circuit was calculated.
The setup time was defined as the input to clock delay that
increased the nominal clock to Q delay by 10%. The total
delay was defined as the sum of the setup time and the nominal
clock to Q delay.
A. Obfuscated 3-Input AND Cell
A 3-input AND function can be constructed with a single
TLG-5. The threshold function representing an AND gate is
f(a, b, c) = [1, 1, 1; 3]. This corresponds to an input signal
assignment of left input network = a¯, 1, 1, 1, 1 and right input
network =a, b, b, c, c. The inputs set to 1 are removed from
equation, as the input transistors are pMOS. To obfuscate
the function a TLG-5 with two obfuscated inputs was used
to implement the function. The unobfuscated inputs were
connected to the low Vt transistors and the obfuscated inputs
were connected to the high Vt transistors. The obfuscated cell
was compared to an unobfuscated TLG-5. The setup time and
clock to Q delay of the CMOS circuit, nonobfuscated and
unobfuscated versions of the cell are shown in Table III for
layout simulation the slow corner of 1.1V 105C SS, with a load
of 20fF. Because an AND function is combinational, yet the
TLG is sequential, a D flip flop was connected to the output of
the CMOS AND gate. The table shows that the TLG version
decreases the setup time and increases the clock to Q delay
compared to the CMOS version. This is due to the structure of
the TLG cell. By having the clock transistors part of the input
network as seen in Figure 1 the setup time becomes really
small. Table III shows the hybrid version of the obfuscated
cells has roughly equal delay compared to the CMOS version.
The increase in delay between the two is 1.1%. Therefore, at
the cell level this approach of obfuscation does not add much
overhead in terms of delay.
B. Obfuscated 3-Input XOR Cell
To demonstrate that this approach for larger circuits a 3-
input XOR cell was demonstrated. Because the truth table
of the XOR function is not monotonic, it is not a threshold
function. Instead, it is calculated using two levels of threshold
gates. The XOR cell was formed using an obstructed TLG-
3 and an obfuscated TLG-5 in 65nm. It consists of a TLG-
Fig. 2. 3-Input XOR Gate with Obfuscated TLG-7
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF CMOS, HYBRID NONOBFUSCATED AND HYBRID
OBFUSCATED 3-INPUT XOR GATE, 1.1V 105C SS WITH 20FF LOAD
CMOS Hybrid Nonobfuscated Hybrid Obfuscated
Setup Time 264ps -61ps -61ps
Clock to Q 258ps 608ps 611ps
Total Delay 522ps 547ps 550ps
3 with outputs N1 and N2 being fed into a NAND gate,
which functions as the clock signal for a TLG-5. In doing
so the XOR function is calculated in a single clock cycle.
The complete circuit is show in Figure 2. In the figure the Ls
and Rs represent the left and right input network of a TLG.
Input transistors L3, L4, R3 and R4 were set to high Vt on the
TLG-3 and input transistors L5, L6, R5 and R6 were set to
high Vt on the TLG-5. The rest of the input transistors were
set to low Vt. In doing so, these eight inputs were logically
removed from the calculation of the XOR function. These fake
inputs can be chosen at random by the circuit designer to
hide the cell’s function. This circuit was compared against
an unobfuscated version of itself in post-layout simulations.
Again, D flip flops were added to the output of the CMOS
XOR gate for a direct comparison between CMOS and TLG
versions. At the corner of 1.1V 105C SS and a load of 20fF,
the delay of the obfuscated and unobfuscated TLG cells along
with their CMOS counterpart are shown in Table IV. The
table shows a 5.1% increase in delay between CMOS and
the obfuscated hybrid version. This increase in delay can be
attributed to a more complicated hybrid version of the XOR
function, than a CMOS implementation.
IV. CIRCUIT LEVEL OBFUSCATION
In this section we use the cell library to obfuscate a Wallace
Tree Multiplier and a FIR Filter. These circuits were synthe-
sized first using nonobfuscated CMOS standard cells. Next,
the circuit was ”hybridized.” The process of hybridization is
described in detail by Kulkarni in [16]. The process involves
searching the synthesized netlist for threshold functions and
then replacing that logic with a TLG cell. The CMOS and
hybrid versions of the circuit were compared for power, area
and delay. The design flow of hybridizing a circuit is as
follows:
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF MULTIPLIER IN CMOS AND OBFUSCATED HYBRID AT
SS 1.1V 105C
CMOS Hybrid Obfuscated
Area 43680 um X um 31856 um X um
Dynamic Power 31mW 21.5mW
Leakage Power 25.5uW 13.96uW
1) A standard cell library of obfuscated TLGs was created
in 65nm technology.
2) The cell library was characterized for worst case delay,
power and leakage. For characterization the obfuscated
inputs are connected to Vdd.
3) The Verilog description of a multiplier and of a fil-
ter were synthesized using Cadence RTL compiler. A
CMOS standard cell library was used in synthesis. The
corner of SS 105C 1.1V was chosen for synthesis.
4) The synthesized netlist produced was hybridized using
the method in [16]. That is, the RTL netlist was edited so
some of the CMOS cells were replaced with TLG cells.
Signals connected to the obfuscated inputs were chosen
at random from inputs in the combinational fan-in to the
TLG cell.
5) The hybridized RTL netlist was synthesized again to
meet a targeted clock period. The TLG cells placed in
the netlist were untouched during synthesis.
6) Both the synthesized CMOS netlist and the synthesized
hybrid netlist were placed and routed separately in
Cadence Encounter.
7) The place and routed netlists for both the CMOS and
hybrid designs were simulated with delay annotation in
Verilog. A large number of inputs corresponding to 30%
switching activity were applied to the two designs in
Verilog. The Verilog netlist, along with the extracted
circuit libraries were given to Synopsys Primetime to
calculate the dynamic power and leakage power of the
different designs.
A. Obfuscating a Multiplier
The multiplier was a 32-bit 2 stage signed Wallace Tree
Multiplier. A CMOS version and a hybrid version were con-
structed to compare the two. They were simulated at 666MHz
with a 30% switching activity. A comparison of the two
versions is shown in Table V. The table shows a decrease
of approximately 27% area, 30% dynamic power and 45.2%
leakage power of the hybridized multiplier compared to the
CMOS version. This is due to the absorption of logic by the
TLG cells. It is also worth noting that the CMOS version is
not obfuscated so it is easy for an attacker to reverse engineer
the design. However, the hybrid version of the multiplier had
112 obfuscated TLGs out of a total of 4382 cells in the
design. Since each obfuscated TLG cell can represent 2 or
more functions and there are 112 obfuscated TLGs in the
circuit, the circuit has potentially 2112 different functions it
can represent. Making the circuit difficult to duplicate.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF FIR FILTER IN CMOS AND OBFUSCATED HYBRID AT
SS 1.1V 105C
CMOS Hybrid Obfuscated
Area 124605 um X um 92720 um X um
Dynamic Power 58.2mW 40.2mW
Leakage Power 83.57uW 46.49uW
B. Obfuscating a FIR Filter
A filter was a second circuit that we used to compare
CMOS to hybrid designs. The FIR Filter was a 32-bit 4 tap
2 stage filter. The circuit was simulated at a frequency of
454MHz with a 30% switching activity at the inputs. The two
versions of the circuit are compared in Table VI above. The
hybrid version is 25% lower area, 30% lower dynamic power
and 44% lower leakage power than the CMOS version. This
circuit, along with the multiplier show how logic is absorbed
by the TLGs during hybridization. The hybrid version of
the filter consisted of 93 obfuscated TLGs out of a total of
13254 cells. Since each obfuscated TLG can consist of 2 or
more functions, the 93 TLGs can correspond to 293 different
functions. Again, this shows it is very difficult to replicate
the circuit’s functionality. It consisted of TLG-5s, with both
1 and 2 obfuscated inputs and TLG-7s and TLG-9s both with
1 obfuscated input. These obfuscated inputs were randomly
connected to combinational inputs in the logic cone.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new way to obfuscate the func-
tionality of digital circuits and protect against counterfeiting.
The approach is to use different threshold voltages on input
transistors in order to logically remove certain inputs from
the functionality of the circuit. This is possible in the TLG
circuit, where the weight of an input is defined by the
threshold voltage. By increasing the threshold voltage of an
input transistor, the associated weight of a certain input can
be set to 0. As it is very difficult to reverse engineer the
threshold voltage of a transistor, an attacker cannot discover
the functionality of the TLG circuit. We have demonstrated
this approach in 65nm extracted layout simulations for an
AND gate and an XOR gate at the cell level. The two gates
showed that by obfuscating the circuit the delay is increased
by approximately 5%. Threshold logic also has the advantage
of absorbing CMOS logic so that the overall circuit design
will be smaller. An obfuscated cell library of 7 cells was
designed and laid out for high level synthesis. The library was
used to obfuscate a Wallace Tree Multiplier and a FIR Filter.
Both circuits were compared to their nonobfuscated CMOS
counterparts. They showed approximately a 26% decrease in
area, 30% decrease in dynamic power and 45% decrease in
leakage power than their static CMOS counterparts.
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